Introduction 1
Campaign contribution s from political action committees (PACs) are often portrayed in the media as the functional equivalent of bribes. In particular, corporate PAC contribution s are described in the popular press as being 'generously ladled out' in order to buy subsidie s and tax breaks. 2 The director of the National Association of Business PACs, Steven Stockmeyer, has even claimed that business PACs receive a higher proportion of negative media coverage (98.4%) than did the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh. 3 The jaundiced public perception of PACs is further bolstered by popular accounts that relate lurid anecdotes and compile descriptive statistics consistent with the claim that corporate PAC contributions buy legislation . 4 It is no surprise then, that a recent opinion poll by the Center for Responsive Politics revealed that most respondents support an outright ban on PAC contributions . 5 Much of this mistrust of PACs is attributable to ignorance; for example, the same poll cited above also revealed that just 41% of respondents were aware that contribution s to candidates are limited by existing laws, while only 4% of respondents knew that current law already prohibits corporate contribution s to candidates. Indeed, this is a manifestation of a more general phenomenon: there is a dearth of systematic and consistent evidence to support the conventional wisdom that money plays a dominant and nefarious role in American politics. 6 The familiar mantra of reform, which advocates that corporate PAC contribution s are bribes, is therefore a simplistic and exaggerated view that plays on this public ignorance. As a tactic of public debate, hyperbolic analogies are to be expected; however, the academic literature on campaign nance has done a disservice to the public policy debate-and to the general advancement of knowledge-by too often taking as self-evident that PAC contribution s are highly valuable to the recipient and donor alike.
Simply put, PAC contribution s are not the only route by which interested money might in uence policy makers and, given existing limits on the size of PAC contributions , neither are they the most likely route. The very idea of building a majority coalition by buying off individual members of Congress (a group not renowned for their delity or trustworthiness ) with small campaign contribution s and without an explicit contracting mechanism, as all the while competing interests work at counter purposes, sound s something akin to herding cats. In contrast, unlimited donations to issue advocacy campaigns or political parties (soft money), would seem a more straightforward means to buy political favors from party leaders, who in turn can then wield the levers of party in uence to deliver on promised favors. Nevertheless, PAC contribution s have been and remain the primary focus of the empirical literature on campaign contributions.
The inordinate attention given to PAC contribution s is essentially an exercise in 'looking under the lamppost'; data on contribution s are readily available and PACs are easily linked to their corporate or industry sponsors. It is therefore a straightforward endeavor to explore statistical relationships between corporate or industry PAC contribution s and the committee assignments or roll call votes of legislators. Indeed, political economists have conducted a myriad of such studies. This literature provides ample evidence that PAC contribution s can be understood 'as if' they were bribes. For example, it is well-established that PAC contribution s ow disproportionatel y to incumbent of ce holders, majority party members, members of powerful committees and to members on committees with jurisdiction s relevant to the PAC sponsor. 7 Similarly, rms and industries that are more highly regulated are more likely to form PACs and provid e more aggregate PAC contribution s than other rms or industries. 8 But there remains one lacuna in this empirical literature: relatively little attention has been devoted to the substantiv e importance of PAC contribution s to either candidates or donors. In short, political economists have expended admirable effort in demonstrating that PAC contribution s are a form of 'interested money', but have largely neglected the question 'how interested?' We argue that the appropriate answer to this question is 'not very'.
We rst describe the rules governing the ow of interested money into politics and present some basic facts about PAC contributions . We then discuss the way in which interested money is thought to in uence policy. Finally, we argue that PAC contribution s are not particularly valuable to either candidates or corporate sponsors. Regarding this latter point, we exploit the recent disclosur e of lobbying expenditure data to demonstrate that corporations spend an order of magnitud e more on lobbying activities than they do on soft money contribution s or than their af liated PACs spend in campaign contributions . Further, corporations spend several orders of magnitud e more on philanthropi c activities. For these reasons, we suggest that corporate PAC contribution s are a far less important phenomenon than has been previously understood .
What is a PAC contribution?
The current federal regulations governing PAC contribution s were established in 1976, in the wake of the landmark Supreme Court decision, Buckley v. Valeo. 9 Current law allows corporations, unions and interest groups to form political action committees (PACs) and pay for operating expenses, but all campaign contribution s from PACs must be funded by donations from individuals, parties or other PACs; contribution s made by parties must come from the same three sources. Consequently , all 'hard money' campaign contribution s must derive from individuals . These campaign contribution s are subject to strict limits: individuals may give $1000 to a candidate (per election), $20,000 to a national party committee and $5000 to a PAC, up to a $25,000 annual limit on aggregate campaign contributions ; PACs may give up to $5000 to a candidate (per election). 10 Further, these limits have never been adjusted for the effects of in ation, so in real terms they have become more restrictive with each passing year.
In contrast to limited hard money, political parties or interest groups may also raise 'soft money' for activities that are not directly related to Federal campaigns, such contribution s are not limited . Soft money donations may come from any non-foreign individual or group, but these funds may not be used to expressly advocate for or against a candidate.
11 Of course, parties and interest groups may use soft money in ways which are close substitute s for campaign spending (e.g., generic issue advocacy or get-out-the-vot e advertisements), or they can transfer soft money among the several state and federal party organizations in order to free up more hard money for direct campaign contributions . 12 Generic issue advocacy advertisements by non-party organizations are often mistakenly referred to as 'independent expenditures'; however, independent expenditures are de ned by federal law to be campaign expenditures made by non-cand idates on behalf of (or against) candidates for federal of ce. 13 The distinction is important: funds raised for independent expenditures are subject to the same hard money contributio n limits described above; issue advocacy is completely unregulated , so it is not known how much money is used for issue advocacy. Consequently , it is dif cult to gauge the extent to which issue advocacy is a substitut e for direct campaign spending. For example, AFL-CIO directed an issue advocacy campaign against freshmen House Republicans in the 1996 national election, however, estimates of the amount spent by the AFL-CIO vary between $15 million and $30 million, and the allocation of this spending across districts is not known, so it is dif cult to assess the ef cacy of this activity. 
Basic PAC facts
The importance of PACs in federal elections begins with the advent of federal limits on campaign contribution s in the mid-1970s. The number of federal PACs jumped from about 1600 in 1978 to over 4000 six years later (see Table 1 ). 15 The number of PACs has since leveled off and has remained close to 4000 ever since. PAC contribution s follow a similar pattern; in 1978, aggregate contribu- tions were just over $92 million dollars (in 1998 dollars), but doubled by 1984. Real PAC contribution s have since hovered between $200 million and $220 million. Table 1 also describes the relative importance of the three major types of PACs, as de ned by the Federal Election Commission. Corporate PACs account for about 40% of all PACs and 35% of all PAC contributions ; despite a modest decrease in the proportion of corporate PACs over time, these PACs account for a greater share of contributions than they did 20 years ago. Trade associations, membership organizations and health PACs (T/M/H) are the second most important PAC type. Labor PACs have declined in number and their share of total contributions , but still account for 20% of all PAC contributions . This suggests that labor PACs give out far more contributions on a per-PAC basis than do corporate PACs. Table 2 shows the size distributio n of PAC contribution s by type; this table con rms that corporate PACs operate on a smaller scale than labor or trade PACs. Only 13% of corporate PAC contribution s come from PACs that give out a total of one million dollars or more; in contrast, 70% of labor PAC contributions come from million-dolla r PACs.
PAC contribution s ow mostly to congressiona l elections; Table 3 The gures in Table 3 also reveal that the share of campaign contribution s from PACs has fallen from 37% to 32% in House races and from 27% to 21% in Senate races. Despite the growing share of total PAC contribution s from corporate PACs, the fraction of total contribution s from corporate PACs has held steady in House races at 11%, while falling slightly in Senate races from 10 to 7%. Consequently , corporate PAC contribution s are neither an important nor growing source of campaign funds for federal candidates. Nevertheless, some of the conventional wisdom about PACs is true. Table 4 veri es that PACs give a disproportionat e share of contribution s to incumbents, which is consistent with the idea that PAC contribution s buy access or legislation . 16 In addition, Table 5 shows that while overall contributions to Democrats tend to be in proportion to their share of House or Senate seats, this is only because labor PACs give such a disproportionat e share of their contributions to Democrats. Otherwise, corporate and trade PACs tend to favor Republicans and this partisan difference has become slightly more pronounced in the most recent elections.
How do PAC contributions in uence legislators?
There are two central questions addressed by the literature on PAC contributions . First, are PAC contribution s like 'cash on the barrel-head', exchanged simultaneously for legislative favors, or are PAC contribution s and political favors exchanged as part of a long-run cooperative equilibrium ? In other words, is there a spot market for political favors or is the market characterized by the existence of implicit contracts? The second debate concerns the terms of trade: do PAC contribution s buy legislation , or do they simply buy access to a legislator?
There are many examples in the political economy literature of theoretical models of a spot market for campaign contributions .
17 Morton and Cameron (1992) review the early literature and nd a common weakness: these are one-period models which implicitly assume the existence of enforceable con- tracts between legislators and contributors . In the absence of such contracts, it is dif cult to understand how a 'spot' market for political favors can exist. In a simple one-period model (absent of perfectly simultaneous exchange) either contributor s or legislators will surely renege on the deal, so no deals are ever made. Ignoring this theoretical dif culty, there is some evidence which is at least consistent with the existence of a spot market. The best direct evidence comes from anecdotes 18 and from the correlation between the roll-call votes of incumbents and the interests of their PAC contributors.
19 However, evidence of this sort fails to control for the preferences of the legislators or their constituents , either of which might have led legislators to vote in a similar fashion in the absence of campaign contributions . Studies that do attempt to control for ideological and constituent preferences 20 nd no evidence of any quid pro quo manifest in the roll-call votes of members of Congress.
In contrast, Stratmann (1992 Stratmann ( , 1995 Stratmann ( , 1998 provides some indirect evidence that is consistent with the existence of a spot market; for example, the timing of PAC contribution s is often coincident with important votes, while PAC money ows more freely to marginal incumbents (who are presumably willing to sell more favors). Of course, these same patterns might emerge for other reasons; for example, important votes on legislation may be a focal time to make contributions, while marginal incumbents may raise more contribution s because they devote more effort to that end. 21 Hall and Wayman (1990) argue that political favors may not take the form of roll-call votes, but instead may be more dif cult to observe activities, such as changes in the content of legislation ; however, in important new work, Wawro (2000) constructs a measure of the legislative effort and nds it largely unrelated to PAC contributions . Further, if PAC contribution s were part of a spot market exchange, one might expect more contribution s to be given to candidates for the most powerful elective of ce, the presidency. In addition, the fact that the one-third of Senators up for election raise three times more PAC money than the remaining two thirds of Senators raises further doubts; if favors are traded simultaneously , then one might expect that Senators would raise similar amounts from PACs in election and non-election years. The alternative conception of the market for favors is a repeat-play reciprocal favors model in which participants provid e favors when the opportunit y arises, then cash in 'chits' as needed. 22 In this model, the potential for cooperation (favor-trading) between contributors and legislators increases in the following factors: the electoral security of the incumbent, the incumbent's place in the legislative hierarchy, and the expected number of years until the incumbent retires. These implications nd support in several studies. 23 In a recent study, Kroszner and Stratmann (2000) nd additional support for the existence of a long-run relationship between PACs and legislators: PACs respond favorably to legislators that generate a reputation for supporting certain interests. Consequently, despite the probable absence of a spot market for political favors, there is little doubt that PAC contribution s are interested money.
But what exactly do PAC contribution s buy? Several authors argue that PAC contribution s buy access to a legislator. 24 To the extent that access translates directly into substantial legislative favors, this is a distinction without a difference, but if access is merely a chance to provide information and argument, then the normative implications of a market for access are not obvious. 25 Consequently, PAC contribution s are better characterized as an entrance fee, rather than a bribe. Still, this does not inform us about whether PAC contribution s and access are important phenomena. McCarty and Rothenberg (1996) provid e some of the most stunning evidence on the limited importance of PAC contribution s (although they do not recognize it as such). McCarty and Rothenberg analyze contribution s from the largest PACs operating during the 1978-1986 election cycles; the mean of non-zero PAC contribution s in this data is $1500 for labor PACs, $1300 for trade PACs and just $700 for corporate PACs. Even after adjusting for the effects of in ation, it is dif cult to imagine that much of consequence is being sold at such low prices.
Corporate campaign contributions in perspective
These amounts are also trivial from the perspective of a candidate. In a competitive race for the House, it is not uncommon for an incumbent to spend well over $1 million; campaign spending in competitive Senate races now rises into the tens of millions of dollars. Given this, the marginal value of a $700 (or even $5000) PAC contributio n would seem to be quite low. This intuition is con rmed by the empirical literature on the electoral effects of campaign spending. The estimated effects of campaign spending vary across studies. For example, neither Levitt (1994) nor Milyo (1998) nd statisticall y signi cant effects of marginal campaign spending in House races, but Gerber (1998) does nd signi cant effects of campaign spending in Senate races. Nevertheless, even using Gerber's more generous estimates, the impact of a $5000 PAC contribu- 1991-1992 1993-1994 1995-1996 1997-1998 Hard Notes: All gures are in millions of constant 1998 dollars. The 1998 election cycle is the rst full two-year cycle for which complete data on lobbying expenditures are available.
tion on the vote share in a typical Senate race is approximately nil. 26 Consequently, individua l PAC contribution s have little to no value at the margin to incumbents in either House or Senate elections. 27 Still, it is possible that PAC contribution s are very important from the perspective of the donor.
In Table 6 , we compare total campaign spending in the most recent presidential and congressiona l elections to contributions from PACs. As noted above, corporate PAC contribution s account for about one-tenth of all Congressional campaign spending. Data on party soft money expenditures are available beginning in the 1992 election cycle; soft money spending has doubled since then and now stands at $220 million, or just about the same amount as the total of all PAC contributions .
28 This is somewhat surprising given that soft money is probably the more ef cacious route for buying political favors, although soft money spending is expected to double again in the 2000 election cycle. The Annenberg Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania compiled data on issue advocacy expenditures in the last two election cycles; using this data, Adat (2000) estimates that issue advocacy spending has also exceeded the total of all PAC contributions .
The 1995 Lobbying Disclosure Act has made information on lobbying expenses available beginning in 1996. 29 Expenditures on lobbying in the 1997-1998 election cycle were $2.6 billion, or an order of magnitude greater than total PAC expenditures. Corporate and trade association, membership organization and health lobbying accounted for about 90% of this total. Perhaps more stunning is the fact that corporations gave over $17 billion to charity during the 1998 election cycle.
30 This is not to say that rms engage in philanthropi c activities for purely altruistic reasons, but the allocation of resources to charity versus lobbying or soft money contribution s is perhaps informative of the priorities of American corporations, as is the fact that charitable giving and lobbying expenses dwarf the sum of all contributions made through PACs.
31
We depict this lesson with the data presented in Table 7 . We compare the political and charitable activities of rms across ve industries reputed to wield vast political in uence (tobacco, pharmaceuticals, telephone utilities, defense aerospace and computers) for the period 1997-1998. 32 For each industry, we list the rms that are af liated with the largest PACs in that industry; for example, Philip Morris, RJR Nabisco and UST, Inc. account for well over half of all tobacco PAC contributions . But these same rms spend nearly twice as much on soft money contribution s and at least 20 times more on lobbying expenses. Nevertheless, corporate philanthrop y appears to be at least as high a priority as lobbying for RJR Nabisco and UST, and a much higher priority for Philip Morris, which spent $120 million on philanthropic activities. The tobacco industry as a whole spent 10 times more on lobbying than soft money and af liated PAC contribution s combined ($105 million versus $6.7 million), while Philip Morris alone gave more to charity than the sum of contribution s from all PACs in 1997-1998. This basic pattern in spending is repeated for each industry. All pharmaceutical rms as a group spent $148 million on lobbying, compared to less than $5 million in either soft money or contribution s from af liated PACs. Individual pharmaceutical rms spent at least two orders of magnitud e more on corporate philanthrop y than soft money and af liated PAC contribution s combined . Only for defense aerospace did the af liated PAC contribution s exceed party soft money, while in every industry lobbying expenses dwarfed PAC or soft money contributions . Further, with only two exceptions (Northrup Grumman and EDS) every rm spent far more on corporate philanthrop y than soft money or af liated PAC contributions .
Conclusion
The popular wisdom, which is echoed in numerous academic studies, asserts that corporate PAC money is extremely in uential in politics. According to this wisdom, corporate PAC contributions : (1) signi cantly determine vote shares and electoral outcomes; (2) distort public policy; and (3) are an important component of corporate business strategies. However, we present several facts that raise some dif cult questions for the conventional wisdom. If corporate PAC contribution s are so important:
(1) Why are they such a small proportion of total campaign spending? (2) Why do so few PACs give the maximum contributio n allowed by law? (3) Why is so little PAC money given to presidential candidates? (4) Why is so little given to senators who are not running for reelection? (5) Why do corporations allocate so much more money to lobbying? (6) Why do corporations allocate even more money to philanthropy ?
We think these questions pose very serious challenges to the conventional wisdom about PAC contributions .
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